Independent New Hampshire Journalism · Northfield, NH
Robert Greene’s twenty-ninth law says to plan all the way to the end, so the finish never takes you by surprise. Two New Hampshire primary campaigns planned to the vote count and not past it. A closed Air Force base on the Seacoast shows what planning to the end looks like.
On a snowy Saturday morning in 1972, nine days before the New Hampshire primary, Sen. Edmund Muskie of Maine stood outside the Manchester offices of the Union Leader and attacked its publisher, William Loeb. The paper had printed a letter accusing Muskie of condoning a slur against French Canadians, and it had reprinted a demeaning item about his wife, Jane. David Broder of The Washington Post reported that Muskie wept as he spoke. Muskie said it was melting snow. He won the primary anyway. Within two months he was out of the race.
Four years later, President Gerald R. Ford beat Ronald Reagan in New Hampshire by less than two points. Reagan had spent the closing days campaigning in Illinois and flew back to the state the afternoon before the vote. “I guess you could call it a win,” he told a reporter that night.
Robert Greene’s twenty-ninth law says to plan all the way to the end: think through the consequences, the obstacles and the turns of luck before you start, so the finish does not take you by surprise. New Hampshire’s primary punishes campaigns that plan to the vote count but not to what the count will mean. Muskie in 1972 and Reagan in 1976, one from each party, show the cost. A third case, from the Seacoast, shows the law working: a closed Air Force base that the state planned to the end, and that kept surprising the planners anyway.
The stage
The primary is the first real ending a presidential campaign faces, and it is never just a number. The press and the other campaigns decide what a result means, usually against a forecast that someone set months earlier. A candidate who wins by less than expected can lose the story. A candidate who loses by less than expected can win it. Planning to the end in New Hampshire means planning for that second verdict as well as the first.
Greene’s law, as he frames it, asks for exactly that. The ending is the point. Most people, he argues, plan only as far as the first success and are then carried along by events they did not foresee. The disciplined player sees the finish line, the hazards along the way and the moment to stop, and plans backward from there.
Muskie, 1972: the forecast that beat him
Muskie came into 1972 as the Democrat most observers expected to win the nomination, Encyclopaedia Britannica records. He was from next door, and New Hampshire was supposed to be his.
The trouble started with what victory was supposed to look like. Broder wrote years later that Muskie’s campaign had publicly aimed for at least 50 percent. Britannica puts the expectation higher still, at 65 percent. Either way, the campaign had let a number stand as its finish line, and the number was out of its control.
Then came Loeb. The Union Leader ran a front-page editorial built on what became known as the Canuck letter and reprinted an unflattering item about Jane Muskie. On the Saturday before the primary, Muskie went to the paper’s offices to answer in person. Broder’s story of a candidate in tears ran as the off-lead in the Sunday Post. In a 1987 essay for The Washington Monthly, Broder wrote that it was “unclear whether Muskie did cry.” He also wrote that later reporting showed the Canuck letter was part of a Nixon White House sabotage operation, something he had not known when he filed. He said he had “unwittingly” helped damage the candidate. He also admitted he never asked Muskie directly whether he had wept, and titled the essay after the feeling it left him with: the story still nagged at him.
On March 7, 1972, Muskie won with 46 percent. Sen. George McGovern had 37. A nine-point win should have been good news. Measured against the campaign’s own forecast, it read as a setback, and Britannica calls it the “hollowest of victories.” Muskie lost his front-runner status after Florida, lost Pennsylvania and trailed McGovern in Massachusetts. He quit in late April. McGovern took the nomination and lost to President Richard Nixon in one of the largest landslides in American history.

Greene would point to the forecast, not the snow. A campaign that plans to the end decides in advance what a good result looks like and keeps that bar where it can clear it. Muskie’s campaign set a bar it did not need, and the press measured him against it. Loeb’s attack and the Nixon operation behind the letter were obstacles the campaign could not have foreseen in detail. The forecast was an obstacle it built itself.
Reagan, 1976: the last days somewhere else
The Republican race four years later turned on a different kind of ending. Reagan challenged a sitting president of his own party. New Hampshire was expected to be less friendly to him than other states, Dartmouth College’s primary history notes. He came close anyway.
On Feb. 24, 1976, Ford won with 49.4 percent to Reagan’s 48, according to Dartmouth’s history. With 89 percent of precincts counted, The Associated Press had Ford ahead by 737 votes, The Michigan Daily reported the next morning. Reagan had been in Illinois, campaigning, and flew back the afternoon before the primary to wait for the returns. Some of his workers said there had been growing pressure on him to win New Hampshire outright.
His campaign tried to call it a moral victory. “We’re not sad,” said press officer John Breen. Ash Burton, the campaign’s publicity coordinator in Concord, put the problem plainly: for Ford, “a win is a win here, no matter how small it is.”

The record does not show that Reagan’s trip to Illinois cost him the state. It shows that a challenger in a race that came down to hundreds of votes spent the final days elsewhere, and lost by less than two points. Ford kept the nomination and lost the general election to Jimmy Carter, Britannica records. Reagan would come back four years later and win New Hampshire by more than two to one, a story this series told in Part Twenty-Five.
Pease: planning past the closing
The cleanest New Hampshire test of the law has nothing to do with a primary. In 1988, Pease Air Force Base in Newington and Portsmouth was one of 86 military installations selected for closure, according to the Air Force Civil Engineer Center. It closed on March 31, 1991. The closure cost the region 3,700 military and 400 civilian jobs, according to a 2015 study by Applied Economic Research, as NH Business Review reported.
The state did not wait for the gates to shut. The Legislature created the Pease Development Authority in the spring of 1991, with a seven-member board and bonding authority of up to $250 million, NH Business Review reported. The law that governs it today says plainly what it was for.
The plan ran long. In April 1992 the authority took control of 1,703 acres under a lease with the Air Force; the last 1,300 acres came over in 1997, NH Business Review reported. In 1992 the Air Force also sent 1,054 acres to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service for the Great Bay National Wildlife Refuge. When George Bald became the authority’s economic development director in 1994, no property had been leased and no jobs had been created. The buildings were often out of code. “It wasn’t very attractive,” Bald said.
The authority held to rules set at the start. Land would be leased, not sold. Zoning was strict, with setbacks and sidewalks. In 1995 it won federal grants to begin demolition. In 1996 the first developer signed a long-term lease. Redhook Brewery opened in 1997. Many prospective tenants saw the base as “a cow pasture with no future,” Renee Plummer of Two International Group recalled. “When we started, everybody thought we were crazy,” Dan Plummer, the company’s president, told the paper. By 2000, Pease was being described as one of the most successful base conversions in the country.
Twenty-five years in, about 250 companies with nearly 10,000 employees had set up at the Pease International Tradeport, NH Business Review reported in 2016. Wages paid there rose from $208.8 million in 2002 to $583.1 million in 2015. The Air Force’s own count, in 2012, was 245 companies and 7,000 people. The tenants range from Lonza, the largest, to State Department visa and passport centers, and Great Bay Community College sits on the site of the old base hospital. David Mullen, the authority’s executive director, called building up the airport’s traffic “a long marathon rather than a sprint.”
Even this plan met an ending nobody wrote into it. The base went on the federal Superfund list in 1990, and the Air Force identified 43 hazardous waste sites. In 2014 a closed water well on the former base was found contaminated, and the state tested tenants the next year. A plan carried all the way to the end still has to answer for what the last owner left behind.
A fair objection
The first objection is that hindsight makes every loser look careless. Muskie could not have planned for a forged letter run by a White House operation. Reagan’s campaign could not know the margin would be 737 votes at 89 percent counted. That is fair. Greene’s law does not promise foresight. It asks a campaign to decide what its ending looks like and to keep that ending within reach. Muskie’s forecast and Reagan’s final days were choices, and both were made before the obstacles arrived.
The second objection is that Pease was not one person’s plan. It was a statute, a board, federal grants, developers and three decades of patience. That is the point. Greene writes for courtiers and generals. New Hampshire’s best example of planning to the end is an institution, built so that the plan outlived any one of the people who made it.
The verdict
Greene’s twenty-ninth law holds in New Hampshire, and the primary shows why. A campaign that plans to election night but not to the morning after can win and still lose, as Muskie did. A campaign that leaves early can lose a race it nearly won, as Reagan did. Pease shows the other side: a state that planned past the closing, set its rules at the start and held to them.
The lesson for anyone who governs here is simple. Write the ending first, including the forecast you will be judged against and the costs someone else may leave you, and then work backward to the first step.
The series has moved from the first move to the last. Part Twenty-Eight showed campaigns that won by moving boldly. Part Twenty-Seven showed crusades that belief carried through the state and no further. Part Twenty-Nine shows what happens to the ones who never planned for the finish.
Next: Law 30, on making your accomplishments seem effortless, tested against the New Hampshire record.
Fact check
| # | Claim | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Snowy Saturday, outside the Union Leader offices in Manchester, nine days before the March 7, 1972 primary; Canuck letter and reprinted item about Jane Muskie; Broder reported tears; Muskie said melting snow; “unclear whether Muskie did cry”; story ran as the Sunday Post off-lead; later reporting tied the letter to a Nixon White House sabotage operation; “unwittingly”; never asked Muskie whether he wept; 46 to 37 percent; campaign publicly aimed for at least 50 percent | ATTRIBUTED | David Broder, “The Story That Still Nags at Me,” The Washington Monthly, February 1987 |
| 2 | Muskie expected to win the nomination; 65 percent predicted; “hollowest of victories”; lost front-runner status after Florida; lost Pennsylvania, trailed in Massachusetts, quit in late April; McGovern nominated; Nixon landslide | ATTRIBUTED | Encyclopaedia Britannica, “United States presidential election of 1972” |
| 3 | Feb. 24, 1976: Ford 49.4, Reagan 48; New Hampshire expected to be less receptive to Reagan | ATTRIBUTED | Dartmouth College, “1976 Presidential Primaries at Dartmouth College” |
| 4 | Ford led by 737 votes at 89 percent of precincts; Reagan campaigned in Illinois and flew back the afternoon before; pressure to win outright; “I guess you could call it a win”; Breen and Burton quotes | ATTRIBUTED | The Michigan Daily, Feb. 25, 1976 (Associated Press count) |
| 5 | Ford was the 1976 Republican nominee and lost to Carter | ATTRIBUTED | Encyclopaedia Britannica, “United States presidential election of 1976” |
| 6 | Pease one of 86 installations selected for closure in 1988; closed March 31, 1991; 1,054 acres to the Great Bay National Wildlife Refuge in 1992; National Priorities List in 1990; 245 companies and 7,000 people (as of 2012) | ATTRIBUTED | Air Force Civil Engineer Center, “Former Pease Air Force Base, NH” fact sheet |
| 7 | 3,700 military and 400 civilian jobs lost; authority created spring 1991, seven members, up to $250 million in bonding; 1,703 acres in April 1992, last 1,300 acres in 1997; Bald hired 1994 with nothing leased; lease-only rule and strict zoning; 1995 demolition grants; 1996 first developer; Redhook 1997; “one of the most successful” conversions by 2000; about 250 companies and nearly 10,000 employees; wages $208.8 million (2002) and $583.1 million (2015); 43 hazardous waste sites; 2014 well contamination and 2015 testing; Bald, Dan Plummer, Renee Plummer and Mullen quotes; Lonza largest tenant; State Department visa and passport centers; Great Bay Community College on the former hospital site | ATTRIBUTED | Michael McCord, “The Pease legacy,” NH Business Review, Feb. 4, 2016 |
| 8 | RSA 12-G:1 purpose language and RSA 12-G:3 “body politic and corporate”; source note 2001, 290:6 | VERIFIED | gc.nh.gov, RSA 12-G |
| 9 | Reagan won New Hampshire in 1980 by more than two to one | ATTRIBUTED | Granite State Report, Power Playbook Part Twenty-Five, and the sources cited there |
| 10 | Featured photograph: aerial view of Newington, above Portsmouth and the Piscataqua River, Carol M. Highsmith, LC-DIG-highsm-48352, no known restrictions | VERIFIED | Library of Congress catalog record 2017884982 |
| 11 | Robert Greene’s Law 29 is “Plan All the Way to the End,” from The 48 Laws of Power, Viking, 1998 | VERIFIED | Published table of contents; Shortform list |
| 12 | GSR Power Index scores for Laws 1 through 29 | EDITORIAL | Granite State Report’s own rating, not a measurement. Method stated in the chart |
Your voice
Poll. Which matters more in a New Hampshire primary result?
Who finishes first · How the result compares with expectations · Both equally · Neither; the delegates are what count
Survey: what happened after Pease. Five questions: your town; whether you or your family worked at Pease Air Force Base or at the tradeport; what the closing meant for you; how you rate the redevelopment, on a scale of one to five; and what the state should have planned for that it did not. Granite State Report asks before using your name or story.
Discuss. Should campaigns stop publishing vote targets for New Hampshire? And when the state plans a project for decades, as it did at Pease, who should answer for the costs nobody planned for?
Verified New Hampshire residents vote and answer at granitestatereport.com. Or write to granitestatereport@gmail.com with your town in the subject line.
Granite State Report wants to hear from former airmen, civilian workers, tradeport tenants, campaign staff and voters. granitestatereport@gmail.com, 603-931-9264. Confidentiality on request.
Editor’s note: Commentary and analysis, not legal advice. The statute was read directly. Accounts of the 1972 and 1976 campaigns and of Pease’s redevelopment come from contemporary and later reporting and are attributed. Broder and Britannica give different forecasts for Muskie; both are shown. The Secretary of State’s results database could not be read for this piece. The GSR Power Index is editorial, not data.

