How Americans Actually Feel About an Independent‑Party “Revolution”
Granite State Report — Research Briefing & Analysis
By: Granite State Report
Executive summary
Talk of an “independent party revolution” surges every cycle—especially when voters are angry, tired, or turned off by the major‑party choices. The public really is dissatisfied with the two parties and with politics more broadly. Credible, nationally representative surveys show:
- A large bloc of Americans self‑identify as independent or “something else” (roughly four‑in‑ten by Pew’s 2025 benchmark), even as most of those “independents” lean toward one party in how they vote.
- Many Americans say they want more than two parties, especially younger adults, though measures of this preference vary by question wording and year.
- Trust in the federal government remains historically low, and Americans describe their feelings about politics as exhausted and angry—fertile ground for alternatives.
- When ballots are counted, third‑party/independent presidential votes remain a small share of the total, constrained by winner‑take‑all rules and ballot‑access hurdles. In 2024, all “other” candidates together won under 2% of the national popular vote, according to official compilations.
Put plainly: appetite for more choice is real; successful revolutions are rare. This report synthesizes what robust surveys, election data, and reform case studies say about how Americans feel about an independent breakthrough—and what would have to change for feelings to become votes.
1) The mood: alienation, exhaustion, and a search for alternatives
Across multiple reputable surveys, Americans tell pollsters they are fed up with politics and skeptical that institutions represent them well. In Pew Research Center’s long‑running series, just about one in five Americans in mid‑2024 said they trusted Washington to do the right thing “just about always” or “most of the time.” The level is near 70‑year lows.
Qualitative descriptors in Pew’s fall 2023 deep dive are blunt: “exhausted,” “angry,” and “broken” were common volunteered terms for U.S. politics; 65% said they often feel exhausted when thinking about politics. Those sentiments persisted into 2024–25.
A separate nonpartisan tracker from the Partnership for Public Service also found trust depressed in 2024 (about 23%), with a modest rebound into 2025—but still historically low. Low trust correlates with receptivity to “outsider” or nontraditional political options.
It’s natural in this environment that many Americans flirt with the idea of more parties. In 2023, 37% told Pew they wanted more than two parties to choose from, with support higher among adults under 50. That figure taps a broader frustration: record shares report unfavorable views of both parties.
Bottom line: Voters are emotionally primed for alternatives. But feelings alone don’t restructure a political system.
2) Who are the “independents,” really?
A striking share of Americans say they’re independent or “something else.” In Pew’s 2025 National Public Opinion Reference Survey, 41% identified that way. Yet decades of research show that most independents lean toward one party and vote much like partisans. True “non‑leaners” comprise a small minority and are typically less interested in politics.
This dual reality helps explain a central paradox:
- Perception: There’s a huge, up‑for‑grabs “independent middle” waiting to be mobilized.
- Reality: Many “independents” act like Democrats‑or‑Republicans‑in‑all‑but‑name, making wholesale realignment far harder than topline identity numbers imply.
Understanding that gap is essential to judging the prospects for an independent party. Americans like independence—but they usually vote with one of the two parties when choices get concrete.
3) The two‑party gravity well: why structure beats sentiment
Political scientists have a name for the undertow that pulls voters back to the big two: Duverger’s Law. In systems with single‑member districts and first‑past‑the‑post counting (whoever has the most votes wins), competition tends to settle into two viable parties over time. Voters and candidates behave strategically to avoid “wasting” votes; minor parties struggle to gain traction.
That dynamic is not a conspiracy; it’s math. And it is why, despite periodic surges, most independent or third‑party runs recede after Election Day.
Historical reminders:
- 1912: Theodore Roosevelt’s Progressive (Bull Moose) Party won 27.4% of the popular vote—an extraordinary feat—but could not sustain itself beyond the cycle.
- 1968: George Wallace won 13.5% and 45 electoral votes; his American Independent Party didn’t become a durable national force.
- 1992: Ross Perot won 18.9%, the best since 1912, yet the effort did not convert into a lasting major party.
2024 offers a fresh reality check. The official postelection tally shows Donald Trump with ~49.8% of the popular vote, Kamala Harris with ~48.3%, and all other presidential candidates combined below 2%—illustrating how two‑party gravity reasserts itself by November.
4) Ballot access: the unglamorous barrier voters do notice
Even if voters want more options, getting on the ballot is hard for new parties and independent candidates. Rules vary by state, with signature requirements, deadlines, and party‑recognition thresholds that differ sharply—and often favor established parties. The National Association of Secretaries of State provides a 50‑state summary; Ballotpedia maintains state‑by‑state details.
These aren’t just hypotheticals: in 2024, the centrist group No Labels raised substantial funds and gained access in many states—but ultimately abandoned its presidential ticket after failing to identify candidates with a credible path. Even well‑funded efforts can stall on logistics and politics long before voters have a chance to choose.
Ballot access hurdles also affected minor parties directly. In one high‑profile case, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to restore the Green Party to Nevada’s 2024 ballot after procedural missteps—another reminder that process matters as much as sentiment.
5) Feelings vs. votes: what the 2024 results say
The 2024 election crystallized the structural challenge. Despite visible publicity for multiple non‑major candidates, official totals show:
- Trump: ~77.3 million votes (49.8%)
- Harris: ~75.0 million votes (48.3%)
- All others combined: ~2.9 million (≈1.9%)
(Results compiled by the Federal Election Commission and summarized by the American Presidency Project.)
Within those “others,” Green nominee Jill Stein and Libertarian nominee Chase Oliver each finished under 1% nationally; RFK Jr.’s late‑breaking independent bid ended with well below a single percentage point after ballot‑access and campaign shifts, per the FEC’s certified state filings.
However one feels about those choices, the data point to a hard truth: dissatisfaction is not the same as a durable third force under present rules.
6) What voters say they want—nuanced, not revolutionary
When surveys ask about more parties in the abstract, support is real (especially among younger adults). But it’s not a stampede: about a third of Americans, not a majority, explicitly say they want more parties—though share and wording vary by poll. And when the question shifts to a specific independent ticket, support softens as worries about “spoilers” and “wasted votes” kick in.
The same respondents often carry negative emotions about politics—exhaustion, anger—which makes an independent appeal emotionally plausible. Yet those emotions coexist with habits (straight‑ticket voting), strategic calculations, and cue‑taking from media and social networks that channel choices back to the big two.
An under‑appreciated factor: independent‑leaners resemble partisans in attitudes and votes. It’s not a single centrist bloc waiting for a “middle” party; rather, it’s two pools of leaners parked outside the party label who still vote consistently with one side. That complicates any “big tent independent” pitch.
7) Where an “independent revolution” feels most plausible
If a revolution happens, it likely begins locally or via rules changes rather than a top‑down national shock.
- Ranked‑choice voting (RCV) & Top‑four/Top‑five models. Maine uses RCV in federal races and has expanded and refined the practice; Alaska’s nonpartisan, top‑four primary with RCV now structures state and federal elections, and voters chose to keep the system rather than repeal it. These changes maximize voter choice while reducing the spoiler problem that suppresses third‑party participation.
- Voter experience with RCV: Post‑election surveys compiled by reform groups like FairVote show strong user satisfaction where RCV is tried (e.g., Oakland and other cities), though critics remain and local outcomes vary. The American Bar Association’s 2025 review of the academic literature likewise summarizes evidence that RCV can encourage coalition‑building and more representative outcomes.
While research and advocacy are not the same, the trend line is clear: where rules reduce the risk of “wasting” a vote, openness to non‑major candidates rises. That sentiment—“give me more choice without helping the side I dislike”—shows up repeatedly in focus groups and voter‑education efforts.
8) What focus groups and deliberations reveal about “independent” appetite
Traditional polls quantify sentiment; deliberative polls and focus groups add texture. Projects like America in One Room (run by Stanford’s Deliberative Democracy Lab with partners) find that when Americans have time, information, and space to discuss trade‑offs, some preferences moderate and support often rises for pragmatic problem‑solving—precisely the lane many independents try to claim.
Ongoing swing‑voter groups (Engagious/Sago in partnership with Axios, NBC News and academic collaborators) routinely surface voters who express openness to alternatives but remain risk‑averse about “spoiling” outcomes in close races. Even among frustrated voters, the tactical instinct to block the “greater evil” is powerful—another form of two‑party gravity.
9) The 2024 case study: why the “revolution” didn’t break through
Three ingredients define whether a new party or independent surge can truly break out:
- Compelling demand (voters want something different)
- Viable supply (a well‑defined party or candidacy with cross‑cutting appeal)
- Favorable rules (or at least neutral ones)
In 2024, (1) was present in the mood data. But (2) and (3) were lacking:
- Supply: No Labels’ retreat underscored how hard it is to recruit credible standard‑bearers who see a path to victory. Meanwhile, individual independent/minor‑party bids split attention, lacked universal ballot access, and faced tactical headwinds—especially once the major‑party race tightened.
- Rules: Winner‑take‑all presidential elections magnify spoiler anxiety; debate access and media framing reinforce a two‑choice narrative; and ballot‑access fights siphon time and money. The Green Party’s Nevada litigation shows how process errors can be fatal late in the game.
The outcome—sub‑2% of the national vote for all “others”—doesn’t mean Americans are content with two parties. It means that discontent didn’t meet the structural threshold for a breakthrough in 2024.
10) So, how do Americans feel about an “independent party revolution”? Five takeaways
- They’re open—but conflicted. Many Americans like the idea of more parties and dislike the current choices. But risk aversion (“wasting my vote”) blunts behavior when stakes feel high.
- “Independent” is as much a brand as a bloc. It signals disaffection and distance from party institutions, not necessarily a centrist ideology. Most independents lean and vote like partisans.
- Structural features shape feelings. Winner‑take‑all rules make independent votes feel risky; reforms like RCV and top‑four primaries can free voters to express preferences without fear.
- Ballot access matters emotionally. Voters notice when options aren’t on the ballot; they also infer viability from ballot presence and debate inclusion. The process shapes the psychology.
- Revolutions are more likely to be incremental. Expect more local‑level gains, coalition‑style wins in reformed jurisdictions, and “brand‑new old” coalitions inside major parties—unless rules change more broadly.
11) What would change voter feelings into a real independent surge?
A. Normalize choice with rule changes. The most cited reforms that reduce the “spoiler” penalty:
- Ranked‑choice voting in general elections (statewide as in Maine; statewide with top‑four primaries as in Alaska). Both states provide real‑world case studies and have seen voters continue or expand usage.
- Open or nonpartisan primaries (e.g., Alaska’s system), which let more than two options advance and give non‑party voters a meaningful say.
B. Build consistent ballot access. Sustained logistics—meeting signature thresholds, complying with paperwork rules, maintaining party recognition thresholds—are prerequisites for legitimacy. The 50‑state differences are nontrivial.
C. Compelling, cross‑cutting candidates—and patience. History suggests that multiple cycles of building, down‑ballot wins, and a strong organizational backbone are needed before presidential traction is plausible. (Perot and Roosevelt show that vote spikes are possible—but not self‑sustaining under current rules.)
12) What the reform evidence says (without the hype)
The research record on RCV and open primaries is growing:
- Voter understanding & satisfaction: Post‑election surveys in RCV jurisdictions report majorities find the system straightforward and preferable after trying it. (Advocacy‑compiled but multi‑jurisdictional).
- Coalition incentives: Legal and academic reviews (e.g., ABA 2025) summarize evidence that RCV can temper zero‑sum campaigning and incentivize broader appeals.
- State case studies: Alaska’s top‑four + RCV model has measurably changed candidate strategies and outcomes; voters recently affirmed keeping it.
None of this makes a third party inevitable. It does soften the psychological and mechanical constraints that keep dissatisfied voters tethered to the two parties.
13) The 2025 public‑opinion baseline to watch
Heading into 2026 midterms and beyond, three trendlines best capture whether feelings about an independent revolution are deepening or dissipating:
- Trust & affect: Whether trust in government and emotional exhaustion recover meaningfully from 2024’s lows. (As of 2025, trust is still low.)
- Partisan identity: The share identifying as independent/“something else,” and—crucially—how many are true non‑leaners. (So far, the share of non‑leaners remains small.)
- Reform adoption: Whether more states adopt or retain systems (RCV, top‑four/top‑five primaries) that lower the perceived risk of supporting non‑major candidates. (Maine and Alaska remain the key test beds.)
If trust rises and reforms spread, the emotional case for independents could finally meet a structural path—the closest thing to a peaceful “revolution” the U.S. system allows.
- PBS NewsHour: What to know about 2024’s third‑party candidates.
2. Vox: Ranked‑Choice Voting, explained in 60 seconds.
3. Explainer: Duverger’s Law—why two parties dominate.
4. PBS NewsHour: Brooks & Capehart on third‑party dynamics.
Methodology & caveats
- Question wording matters. “Do you want more parties?” does not equal “Will you vote for X independent?” Be cautious comparing across polls and years.
- Independents vs. leaners. Most “independents” lean, and leaners behave like partisans—an analytic standard used by Pew and other major pollsters.
- Outcome vs. intent. The FEC’s certified results reflect ballots actually cast, not survey intentions months prior. Use certified results for behavioral inferences.
Practical implications for organizers, candidates, and journalists
- Frame the choice, not just the critique. Voters are emotionally primed for alternatives but worried about consequences. Reforms that reduce “wasted vote” risk can change behavior; merely reminding voters that “both parties are bad” usually does not.
- Invest locally and build proof of concept. Durable independent gains are likeliest in city and state contests—especially in places using RCV or open/nonpartisan primaries—before a national leap.
- Respect the leaners. Don’t assume a vast centrist army. Segment the “independent” electorate by lean and issues to avoid category errors.
- Mind the paperwork. Ballot access and compliance are the difference between being an idea and being a choice.
References
- Public mood & trust Pew Research Center, Public Trust in Government: 1958–2024 (June 2024). Partnership for Public Service, State of Public Trust in Government 2024/2025. Pew Research Center, Americans’ Dismal Views of the Nation’s Politics (Sept. 2023).
- Independents & leaners Pew Research Center, Political Independents: Who They Are, What They Think (2019) and methodological notes on leaners. Pew Research Center, Changing Partisan Coalitions (April 2024). Pew Research Center NPORS Fact Sheet: Party identification (Jan. 2025).
- Desire for more parties Pew Research Center, Support for More Political Parties is Higher Among Adults Under 50 (Oct. 2023).
- Election results Federal Election Commission, Official 2024 Presidential General Election Results (certified compilation). American Presidency Project, 2024 Election Statistics.
- Historic third‑party benchmarks American Presidency Project, 1912, 1968, 1992 election statistics.
- Ballot access & process National Association of Secretaries of State, Summary: State Laws on Presidential Ballot Access (2024). Ballotpedia, State Ballot Access Regulations for Presidential Candidates. Reuters, Supreme Court declines to restore Greens to Nevada ballot (2024).
- Reform case studies & evidence Maine Secretary of State, Ranked‑Choice Voting resources & FAQ. Alaska Division of Elections, How Alaska’s Top‑Four Primary & RCV Work. American Bar Association (Task Force for American Democracy), What We Know About Ranked‑Choice Voting (2025). FairVote, Ranked‑Choice Voting in 2024: Year‑End Report; Alaska votes to keep RCV.
- No Labels / 2024 third‑party attempt Reuters / CBS News / NPR coverage of No Labels’ decision not to field a ticket (April 2024).
- Conceptual background Duverger’s Law overview.
Quotes
- “Americans want more political choice—but under current rules, they rarely risk it.”
- “Most ‘independents’ lean and vote like partisans; a true non‑leaning middle is small.”
- “Reform is the lever: Where RCV and open primaries reduce ‘wasted vote’ fears, openness to alternatives grows.”
FAQ
Is the U.S. on the cusp of an independent party revolution?
The public is primed—low trust, high exhaustion, persistent dislike for both parties. But under present rules, the two‑party system still channels that frustration back into major‑party votes. A revolution is possible only if rule changes and disciplined, ballot‑qualified organizing converge over multiple cycles.
Why do polls say people want more parties, but third parties still underperform?
Because preference and behavior diverge under risk. Voters like choice; they fear “helping the side they dislike.” RCV and similar reforms narrow that gap.
How did third parties do in 2024?
Collectively under 2% of the national popular vote; headline independents and minor parties were far from the Perot or Roosevelt benchmarks.
The Granite State Report verdict
Americans increasingly feel that the two parties don’t fully represent them. But feelings alone don’t produce a viable new party. The path from mood to movement runs through rules that lower risk, relentlessly competent ballot access, and credible candidates who can attract leaners from both sides. Until those pieces are in place, expect the “independent revolution” to be more incremental than insurgent—with the most meaningful experimentation happening in cities and states that have already changed how votes are cast and counted.
Editor’s note: This report synthesizes recent, nonpartisan public‑opinion research, certified election results, and state election guidance. Where sources are advocacy‑adjacent, we signal that and pair them with official or academic materials. All key claims are linked to their originating source for verification.
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